hosts_access, hosts.deny, hosts.allow - tcp wrapper format
of host access
control files
This manual page describes a simple access control language
that is based
on client (host name/address, user name), and server (process name, host
name/address) patterns. Examples are given at the end. The
impatient
reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
quick introduction.
An extended version of the access control language is described in the
hosts_options(5) document.
In the following text, daemon is the process name of a network daemon
process, and client is the name and/or address of a host requesting service.
Network daemon process names are specified in the inetd configuration
file.
The access control software consults two files. The search
stops at the
first match:
+o Access will be granted when a (daemon,client) pair
matches an entry
in the /etc/hosts.allow file.
+o Otherwise, access will be denied when a (daemon,client)
pair matches
an entry in the /etc/hosts.deny file.
+o Otherwise, access will be granted.
A non-existing access control file is treated as if it were
an empty
file. Thus, access control can be turned off by providing
no access control
files.
Each access control file consists of zero or more lines of
text. These
lines are processed in order of appearance. The search terminates when a
match is found.
+o A newline character is ignored when it is preceded by a
backslash
character. This permits you to break up long lines so
that they are
easier to edit.
+o Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character
are ignored.
This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so
that the tables
are easier to read.
+o All other lines should satisfy the following format,
things between
[] being optional:
daemon_list : client_list [ : shell_command ]
daemon_list is a list of one or more daemon process names
(argv[0] values)
or wildcards (see below).
client_list is a list of one or more host names, host addresses, patterns
or wildcards (see below) that will be matched against the
client host
name or address. When a client_list item needs to include
colon characters
(for IPv6 addresses), the item needs to be wrapped with
square
brackets.
The more complex forms daemon@host and user@host are explained in the
sections on server endpoint patterns and on client username
lookups, respectively.
List elements should be separated by blanks and/or commas.
With the exception of YP netgroup lookups, all access control checks are
case insensitive.
The access control language implements the following patterns:
+o A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name
is matched
if the last components of its name match the specified
pattern. For
example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name
`wzv.win.tue.nl'.
+o A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched
if its first numeric fields match the given string.
For example,
the pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost)
every host on
the Eindhoven University network (131.155.x.x).
+o A string that begins with an `@' character is treated
as a YP netgroup
name. A host name is matched if it is a host
member of the
specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
for daemon
process names or for client user names.
+o An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a
`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is
equal to the
bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the
net/mask pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches
every address
in the range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'.
Note that the
`m.m.m.m' portion must always be specified.
+o An expression of the form `ipv6-addr/ipv6-mask' is interpreted as a
masked IPv6 address match, just like a masked IPv4 address match
(see above). Note that the `ipv6-mask' portion must
always be specified.
+o An expression of the form `ipv6-addr/prefixlen' is interpreted as a
masked IPv6 address match (with mask specified by numeric prefixlen),
just like a masked IPv4 address match (see
above). Note
that the `prefixlen' portion must always be specified.
The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
ALL The universal wildcard, always matches.
LOCAL Matches any host whose name does not contain a dot
character.
UNKNOWN Matches any user whose name is unknown, and matches
any host
whose name or address are unknown. This pattern
should be used
with care: host names may be unavailable due to
temporary name
server problems. A network address will be unavailable when the
software cannot figure out what type of network it
is talking
to.
KNOWN Matches any user whose name is known, and matches
any host whose
name and address are known. This pattern should be
used with
care: host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server
problems. A network address will be unavailable
when the software
cannot figure out what type of network it is
talking to.
EXCEPT
Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this
construct
matches anything that matches list_1 unless it matches
list_2. The EXCEPT
operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
client_lists. The EXCEPT
operator can be nested: if the control language would
permit the use
of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c' would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT
c))'.
If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell
command, that
command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next
section). The
result is executed by a /bin/sh child process with standard
input, output
and error connected to /dev/null. Specify an `&' at the end
of the command
if you do not want to wait until it has completed.
Shell commands should not rely on the PATH setting of the
inetd. Instead,
they should use absolute path names, or they should
begin with an
explicit PATH=whatever statement.
The hosts_options(5) document describes an alternative language that uses
the shell command field in a different and incompatible way.
% EXPANSIONS
The following expansions are available within shell commands:
%a (%A) The client (server) host address.
%c Client information: user@host, user@address, a host
name, or
just an address, depending on how much information
is available.
%d The daemon process name (argv[0] value).
%h (%H) The client (server) host name or address, if the
host name is
unavailable.
%n (%N) The client (server) host name (or "unknown" or
"paranoid").
%p The daemon process ID.
%s Server information: daemon@host, daemon@address, or
just a daemon
name, depending on how much information is
available.
%u The client user name (or "unknown").
%% Expands to a single `%' character.
Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are
replaced by underscores.
SERVER ENDPOINT PATTERNS [Toc] [Back] In order to distinguish clients by the network address that
they connect
to, use patterns of the form:
process_name@host_pattern : client_list ...
Patterns like these can be used when the machine has different internet
addresses with different internet hostnames. Service
providers can use
this facility to offer FTP, GOPHER or WWW archives with internet names
that may even belong to different organizations. See also
the `twist'
option in the hosts_options(5) document. Many systems can
have more than
one internet address on one physical interface; with other
systems you
may have to resort to SLIP or PPP pseudo interfaces that
live in a dedicated
network address space.
The host_pattern obeys the same syntax rules as host names
and addresses
in client_list context. Usually, server endpoint information is available
only with connection-oriented services.
CLIENT USERNAME LOOKUP [Toc] [Back] When the client host supports the RFC 931 protocol or one of
its descendants
(TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) the wrapper programs can retrieve additional
information about the owner of a connection. Client username information,
when available, is logged together with the client
host name, and
can be used to match patterns like:
daemon_list : ... user_pattern@host_pattern ...
The daemon wrappers can be configured at compile time to
perform ruledriven
username lookups (default) or to always interrogate
the client
host. In the case of rule-driven username lookups, the
above rule would
cause username lookup only when both the daemon_list and the
host_pattern
match.
A user pattern has the same syntax as a daemon process pattern, so the
same wildcards apply (netgroup membership is not supported).
One should
not get carried away with username lookups, though.
+o The client username information cannot be trusted when
it is needed
most, i.e., when the client system has been compromised. In general,
ALL and (UN)KNOWN are the only user name patterns
that make
sense.
+o Username lookups are possible only with TCP-based services, and only
when the client host runs a suitable daemon; in all
other cases the
result is "unknown".
+o Username lookups may cause noticeable delays for nonUNIX users.
The default timeout for username lookups is 10 seconds:
too short to
cope with slow networks, but long enough to irritate PC
users.
Selective username lookups can alleviate the last problem.
For example,
a rule like:
daemon_list : @pcnetgroup ALL@ALL
would match members of the pc netgroup without doing username lookups,
but would perform username lookups with all other systems.
DETECTING ADDRESS SPOOFING ATTACKS [Toc] [Back] A flaw in the sequence number generator of many TCP/IP implementations
allows intruders to easily impersonate trusted hosts and to
break in via,
for example, the remote shell service. The IDENT (RFC 931
etc.) service
can be used to detect such and other host address spoofing
attacks.
Before accepting a client request, the wrappers can use the
IDENT service
to find out that the client did not send the request at all.
When the
client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup
result (the
client matches `UNKNOWN@host') is strong evidence of a host
spoofing attack.
A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches
`KNOWN@host') is less
trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both
the client
connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
harder than
spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that the
client's
IDENT server is lying.
Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.
The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although
the language
uses two access control tables, the most common policies can
be implemented
with one of the tables being trivial or even empty.
When reading the examples below it is important to realize
that the allow
table is scanned before the deny table, that the search terminates when a
match is found, and that access is granted when no match is
found at all.
The examples use host and domain names. They can be improved by including
address and/or network/netmask information, to reduce
the impact of
temporary name server lookup failures.
In this case, access is denied by default. Only explicitly
authorized
hosts are permitted access.
The default policy (no access) is implemented with a trivial
deny file:
/etc/hosts.deny:
ALL: ALL
This denies all services to all hosts, unless they are permitted access
by entries in the allow file.
The explicitly authorized hosts are listed in the allow
file. For example:
/etc/hosts.allow:
ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup
ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain
(no `.' in
the host name) and from members of the some_netgroup netgroup. The second
rule permits access from all hosts in the foobar.edu domain (notice
the leading dot), with the exception of
terminalserver.foobar.edu.
Here, access is granted by default; only explicitly specified hosts are
refused service.
The default policy (access granted) makes the allow file redundant so
that it can be omitted. The explicitly non-authorized hosts
are listed
in the deny file. For example:
/etc/hosts.deny:
ALL: some.host.name, .some.domain
ALL EXCEPT in.fingerd: other.host.name, .other.domain
The first rule denies some hosts and domains all services;
the second
rule still permits finger requests from other hosts and domains.
The next example permits tftp requests from hosts in the local domain
(notice the leading dot). Requests from any other hosts are
denied. Instead
of the requested file, a finger probe is sent to the
offending
host. The result is mailed to the superuser.
/etc/hosts.allow:
tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain
/etc/hosts.deny:
tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h |
/usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and
should be installed
in a suitable place. It limits possible damage from
data sent by
the remote finger server. It gives better protection than
the standard
finger command.
The expansion of the %h (client host) and %d (service name)
sequences is
described in the section on shell commands.
Warning: do not booby-trap your finger daemon, unless you
are prepared
for infinite finger loops.
On network firewall systems this trick can be carried even
further. The
typical network firewall only provides a limited set of services to the
outer world. All other services can be "bugged" just like
the above tftp
example. The result is an excellent early-warning system.
/etc/hosts.allow Access control table (allow list)
/etc/hosts.deny Access control table (deny list)
An error is reported when a syntax error is found in a host
access control
rule; when the length of an access control rule exceeds
the capacity
of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
terminated by a
newline character; when the result of %<letter> expansion
would overflow
an internal buffer; when a system call fails that shouldn't.
All problems
are reported via the syslog daemon.
tcpd(8), tcpdchk(8), tcpdmatch(8)
Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
Department of Mathematics and Computing Science
Eindhoven University of Technology
Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513,
5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
If a name server lookup times out, the host name will not be
available to
the access control software, even though the host is registered.
Domain name server lookups are case insensitive; YP netgroup
lookups are
case sensitive.
The total length of an entry can be no more than 2047 characters long,
including the final newline.
OpenBSD 3.6 June 23, 1997
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